Review of Gary L. Francione\u27s \u3cem\u3eAnimals as Persons\u3c/em\u3e by Milligan, Tony
143
Between the SpecieS
Volume 15, Issue 1
© Between the Species, 2012
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Aug 2012
Review
of
Animals as Persons:
Essays on the Abolition 
of 
Animal Exploitation
Gary L. Francione
Columbia University Press 2009 
256p, paper
Tony Milligan
University of Aberdeen
t.milligan@abdn.ac.uk
Tony Milligan
144
© Between the Species, 2012
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 15, Issue 1
This collection brings together some of Gary Francione’s 
best known and most controversial essays stretching back over 
the past two decades. The gist of Francione’s position is that 
we need to advance beyond the defenses of animals that were 
set out by Peter Singer and Tom Regan more than 30 years 
ago. However, Francione gives us a peculiar mix of the novel 
and the traditional. Unlike Singer and Regan, he is traditional 
in his unhesitating committing to sentientism, to the view that 
“Sentience is necessary to have interests at all” (p.11). This is 
controversial given that it drives apart the moral concern asso-
ciated with animal liberation and the kinds of concern associ-
ated with eco-activism in the interests of the non-sentient (e.g., 
eco-systems, trees and so on). But Francione is comparatively 
untraditional is rejecting the view that a defense of animals re-
quires us to show that their ways of thinking are closely akin to 
our ways of thinking. (A theme pursued in the essay on “Taking 
Sentience Seriously.”)  
Francione is again traditional when he accepts Singer and 
Regan’s views about which ethical norms matter, i.e. rights and 
consequences. He rejects any attempted broadening of ethical 
norms that seeks to include but in some sense go beyond animal 
rights. (A theme pursued in the review essay “Ecofeminism 
and Animal Rights.”) And he endorses the Singer and Regan 
position that, when a serious choice must be made, we may 
have non-prejudicial grounds for favoring humans over non-
humans. He also appeals, just as Singer and Regan do, to the 
argument from marginal cases. (This is a feature of Francione’s 
writing that is sometimes overlooked but it can be found on 
pages 12 and 64 of the present volume.)  His essays are not in 
these respects an attempt to move things on towards a revised 
ethical standpoint. 
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What Francione provides instead is a distinctive political or 
politico-legal response to the plight of animals. It might even 
be unfair to Francione to evaluate his writings as if he were 
carrying out some other task, or more especially the same task 
as Singer and Regan but without a similar depth of argumenta-
tion. Because of this, I will suggest that we have some reason 
to allow Francione extra leeway when his distinctions or back-
ground arguments don’t quite hold together in an ideal man-
ner. Politics requires, and effective political strategy sometimes 
necessitates, an informed rhetoric that favors big ideas and 
striking contrasts which do not always look so clear-cut upon a 
closer analytic interrogation.  Painting with broad brushstrokes 
works well as a provisional, rough-and-ready call for individu-
als to take a political stand and at times it is simply not intended 
as a final and detailed picture. 
A challenge to the legal standing of animals as property is 
the cornerstone of Francione’s position. He claims that the rec-
ognition of the intrinsic value of animals is not just in tension 
with, but is absolutely incompatible with, viewing and treating 
animals in this way. Any serious commitment to animal lib-
eration must therefore require a commitment to end their clas-
sification as property. The big distinction that dovetails with 
this focus is a contrast between those who do not believe that 
animals should be property (“liberationists”) and those who ac-
cept their property standing or who couple a commitment to 
animal liberation with a further belief that it may be assisted by 
incremental changes in animal welfare. If you hold to the latter 
approach then you are, in Francione’s terms, a “new welfarist” 
and not a “liberationist” (p.2). This contrast, familiar in animal 
rights circles, is normative as well as descriptive. It presuppos-
es that we ought to be “liberationists.” It is also a hard and fast 
binary pairing of a sort that may make us uneasy. It supports 
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the claim that those in the two different camps belong, in some 
sense to two different movements, a view that has been seen as 
divisive, or divisive in the wrong way: it takes the small minor-
ity who are committed to animal liberation and turns them into 
an even smaller minority.
I do not think that Francione is presuming (implausibly) that 
most vegetarians or vegans actually happen to hold any explicit 
position on such matters. Most have probably never heard of 
Francione or his “new welfarist” versus “liberationist” contrast. 
(And it is still not a part of the material covered in many under-
graduate courses on applied ethics that deal with the standing 
of animals. It should be, but it isn’t.) What I will suggest is that, 
from Francione’s point of view, the millions of vegetarians and 
vegans who hold no particular position about ultimate goals, 
or about how they might be attained, are in fact, by default, 
“welfarists” or “new welfarists” and so fall on the wrong side 
of the binary contrast. But this may make them precisely the in-
dividuals that Francione wants, in the first instance, to address 
and to win over.
As a familiar critical point about Francione’s contrast, it is 
set up in an unsettling way because it also represents some indi-
viduals with a clear and perhaps dedicated commitment to ani-
mal liberation as “new welfarists” rather than “liberationists.” 
Even so, the political strategy within which the distinction 
plays a role is the rejection of time-wasting welfare measures 
as measures that do not further a recognition of the intrinsic 
value of animals. When it comes to recognizing intrinsic value, 
Francione holds that few things actually make a difference: 
propagandizing is one, and the extension of veganism is anoth-
er, but ultimately the ending of the property status of animals 
is what matters. 
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Here, we might wonder about whether matters have to be so 
clear cut. However, with various empirical examples to back 
up his case, Francione argues that the law always favors hu-
man interests over non-human interests. While animal welfare 
changes do occur they do so always in the interests of humans 
(often the economic interests of humans) rather than in the in-
terests of animals. And so there simply is no legal recognition 
of significant animal interests and nothing that would count as 
moving closer to such recognition while still regarding animals 
as property.
It is at points like this that I wonder about how tidy a separa-
tion we can make between Francione as a political strategist 
and Francione as someone who is trying to set up a plausible 
ethical argument of a far more general sort. What worries me, 
in particular, is that this does look like an attempted ethical 
exploration of the concept of property, and the beginnings of 
an exploration of the concept of intrinsic value, rather than an 
empirical generalization about people who view animals as in-
stances of the former tending not to view them as having any 
of the latter. And this conceptual analysis does seem to form 
part of an argument. What confuses me a little, when I reflect 
upon what Francione is trying to do is that this is not a par-
ticularly good argument. Francione’s claims do not come close 
to supporting his rather strong conclusion. And this makes me 
wonder about whether I have fully understood what he is up to. 
(Perhaps I have missed something important, something that 
would make everything fall into place.) Pointing out that the 
law always puts human interests first (even if correct) gives us 
reasons to say that the law endorses a greater value thesis (that 
humans are always and everywhere more valuable and more 
important than animals). But it is not nearly enough to support 
Francione’s claim that the law endorses a sole value thesis (that 
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only humans have intrinsic value). And so the evidence that he 
gives, about how law invariably functions, is not strictly rel-
evant to the conclusion.
But here, perhaps, I am again falling into precisely the trap 
that I have set out to avoid, perhaps I am making the mistake of 
writing about Francione as if he was trying to do what Singer 
and Regan do (but managing it less effectively, less proficient-
ly). However, this concern too may be a little unfair. It may be 
unfair to Francione’s scholarship to ignore the fact that there re-
ally is much more here than political strategy, even if the direct 
underpinning of a strategy happens to be his dominant concern. 
There is certainly an argument of a sort, one which is shaped by 
legal norms of argumentation (norms which draw from Fran-
cione’s legal background) and these are in many ways different 
from the analytic philosophical norms of argumentation that 
shape the way of writing in Singer and, even more so, Regan. 
Again, perhaps it is my understanding of the position, and what 
is taken for granted, that is flawed. 
At the very least, Francione does try to do something to 
bridge the gap between what is actually shown and the strong 
conclusion that he want us to support, the conclusion that view-
ing animals as property and viewing animals as intrinsically 
valuable cannot ever go together. To bridge the gap he appeals 
to an analogy between animal ownership and slavery in the an-
te-bellum South. And here, again, the appeal is of a fairly broad 
sort that is well-adapted to political debate but which glides 
over the significantly different positions of different sorts of 
slaves such as field-hands compared to house-slaves. Again, 
fairly or unfairly, I am tempted to look beyond political strategy 
and to point out that, to be at all plausible, the strong claim that 
slavery excludes the recognition of a lessened and diminished 
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but nonetheless real intrinsic value would have to depend upon 
more than a single streamlined American case. Slavery covers 
a lot of territory and a lot of institutions and it is far from obvi-
ous, once we cast our eyes a bit further and wider, that the rec-
ognition of property standing and of significant intrinsic value 
have always been incompatible. Ancient Roman slavery would, 
for example, have to be considered as an obvious problem case 
(perhaps more so than slavery in the ante-Bellum South) given 
the steady transition of household slaves into client freedmen 
in the Roman urbs and given the fact that in antiquity, at some 
times and in some places, slaves had sanctuary rights in temples 
while still remaining slaves, hence someone else’s property. 
This looks suspiciously like support for the view that being 
property may be deplorable but it does not necessarily eclipse 
being seen as intrinsically valuable to an extent. In more con-
temporary times, the fact that companion animals are legally 
classified as property, and are at least formally regarded as such 
by the courts (if not by their “owners”) again does not seem 
to have prevented some recent divorce cases in the US from 
involving custody disputes about “pets,” in which rival parties 
have been called upon to make legally-significant claims about 
what is in the best interests of the animals concerned. 
My point here is that Francione acknowledges, but does not 
do justice to the fact that while property may not be a legal fic-
tion (as property skeptics suggest) it is also not absolute and 
that it is standardly qualified in various ways including (and 
this is something Francione absolutely and explicitly rejects) 
recognition, in the case of animals, that the property in ques-
tion is of such a nature that it has interests that the law ought 
to be responsive to. That is to say, it does no good to assert that 
property can’t have interests as if it were a conceptual truth.
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 This being the case, it is extremely difficult to sustain the 
view that no welfare changes can ever be linked to the promo-
tion of a greater legal (or wider) recognition of the intrinsic 
value of animals. I have, I confess, in the course of looking over 
this collection of essays, entirely given up reading Francione as 
an effective defender of this thesis. Perhaps it can be defend-
ed in some significantly different way, but I have reservations 
about even this. (I do not know what a convincing defense of 
the thesis would look like.) Nonetheless, what Francione does 
marvelously well, is to direct the reader’s attention to the genu-
ine dangers of regarding animals as property and to the need 
for a strategy to move things forward beyond this degrading 
subordination. In some way that I cannot quite fathom he also 
does this better than almost any other author that I know. This 
is not, of course, praise of a sort that Francione will want, but 
neither is it faint or damning.
